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Differences Across States, 1966:
An Econometric Analysis
2.1Introduction
Part1 has suggested the importance of advances in
medical technologyinexplaining postwar trends in
expenditures, utilization, and physician productivity. In
order to gain an understanding of physician and patient
behavior net of technological change, we now turn to a
cross-sectional model. By examining differences across
states at a single point in time we are in effect holding
medical technology fairly constant. There may be some
lag in the spread of new knowledge from one state to
another, but the difference between the frontier of
knowledge in the most and least advanced states in any
given year isfar less than the change that occurred
between 1948 and 1968 in the United States as a
whole.1
Another advantage of the cross-sectional approach is
that it provides an opportunity to learn something about
the factors influencing the supply of physicians. It is
widely recognized that there are substantial barriers to
entry into medicine. These are partly financial and
partly caused by the reluctance of organized medicine to
expand the volume of training facilities to the point
where all applicants with an ability to pay would be
accepted. Moreover, it takes a long time to establish a
new medical school, and there is a lag of five or more
years between the time a student enters medical school
and the time he begins to practice. It follows that the
total number of practicing physicians in the country
cannot be responsive to any important degree to annual
changes in price or other market conditions. By contrast,
the potential elasticity of physician supply going to any
one stateisverygreat. Previous investigators have
already demonstrated that licensing procedures pose no
significant impediment to interstate migration of physi-
'Differencesinactual medical practice across states are
undoubtedly larger than differences in the frontier of medical
knowledge. Our interpretation of the technological factor in
demand, however, is predicated upon the assumption that the
demand for physicians' services increases with an expansion in
the range of services physicians are technically able to offer.
Variations in actual medical practice across states are viewed
primarily as the consequence of variations in demand rather than
as their cause.
cians. (See [7], [24] .)Withentry into the total market
effectivelylimited,thegeographical distribution of
physicians has become a matter of particular concern.
2.2A Framework for Analysis
Percapita expenditures for physicians' services vary
considerably across states. In 1966, such expenditures
were $68.68 in California compared with $26.42 in
South Carolina.2 l'his is a greater variation than the
change that occurred in the national average between
1948 and 1965.
How are we to explain such large variations in
expenditures? By definition, expenditures are equal to
quantity multiplied by price. More fundamentally, then,
our task is to explain interstate variations in price and
quantity. To do this economists employ a general model
of demand and supply. In such a model the quantity
demanded by consumers depends upon price and many
other variables, some of which are applicable to any
commodity, e.g., per capita income, and others that may
be relevant only to one or a few commodities, e.g.,
health insurance. The quantity provided by suppliers is
also treated as a function of price and other variables. In
equilibrium, the quantity demanded is exactly equal to
the quantity supplied; hence, actual quantity and actual'
price are simultaneously determined through the inter-
action of the demand and supply functions.
Specification of a model for physicians' services
establishes a general framework within which a broad
range of hypotheses regarding the behavior of patients
and physicians can be investigated. Each structural
equation of the model offers an explanation for the
determinants of a particular aspect of the market for
2The range of variation in per capita disposable income was
less in that year for the thirty-three states in our
having a high value of $3,185 in Connecticut and a low
$1,586 in Mississippi. The coefficients of variation for per
physician expenditures and per capita income were 24.0
cent and 16.0 per cent, respectively. State data for 1965 and
show about the same degree of variation as in 1966.
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physicians' services. Our model has one equation dealing
with variationsin demand, one for the number of
physicians, one for physician productivity, and one for
the amount of insurance coverage.
Because the variables we wish to explain are not
determined independently of one another, itis not
possible to test our behavioral hypotheses accurately
with ordinary least-squares regression equations. For
example, one clear implication of the interdependency
among these variables is that we cannot discover the true
influence of price on physicians' locational choice by
simply relating the total number of physicians practicing
in a state to the observed price of physicians' services
there. Possibly a demand-induced rise in price does tend
to attract many physicians to a state; but this increase in
supply willserve to depress price back towards its
original level if the population can only be induced to
purchase the additional services at a somewhat reduced
price.
To cope with this problem we estimate each of the
structural equations of our model by means of two-stage
least squares. This procedure allows one to statistically
disentangle the web of mutual causality in order to
isolate the specific effect of one variable on another. The
method consists of obtaining predicted values for each
endogenous variable by regressingitonallof the
exogenous variables in the model.3 This is the first stage.
The structural equation for each endogenous variable is
then estimated by regressing the actual value of that
variable on the predicted values of appropriate endoge-
nous variables and on relevant exogenous variables. This
is the second stage. With endogenous variables repre-
sented by their predicted values, the estimated regression
coefficientsare not biased by any effectthat the
dependent variables may have on them.
When employing this two-stage procedure for esti-
mating relationshipsinvolvingsimultaneouslydeter-
mined variables, only those exogenous variables that
appear in the model should be used in estimation of the
first stage. Use of any other exogenous variables may
improve the fit in a given sample, but this improvement
isspurious because the additional variables play no
independent role in the system. A priori considerations
can suggest which vanables, endogenous and exogenous,
are potentially important in explaining the variation we
3Endogenous variables are determined within the system
("jomtly determined"), while exogenous variables are deter-
mined outside the system ("predetermined").
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observe, but the final determination of which variables
to include in the model is itself an empirical question.
Once experimentation with a preliminary, large-scale
model determines that certain exogenous variables are
actually of no value in the second-stage equations, a new
set of first-stage endogenous variable estimates should be
formed, based only on the more restrictedset of
exogenous variables that have been shown to bear a
significant relation to the supply-demand mechanism.4
The rejected hypotheses of the initial model are, of
course, an integral part of the conclusions of such an
analysis.
The model we present inthe following section
excludes many variablesthat one might reasonably
expect to affect the demand for, or supply of, physi-
cians' services. The reason for their omission is that tests
based upon a preliminary model employing seventeen
exogenous variables revealed that only five of these did,
in fact, appear in the system.5 On these grounds we
excluded the other twelve exogenous variables from the
condensed version of the model presented below, which
alone can be considered to possess an unbiased set of
first-stage (predicted) endogenous variables. Discussions
of the excluded variables and their role in the original
model are incorporated into section 2.3, under the
appropriate subheadings. A complete list of the variables
appearing in each model is presented in Table 16.
2.3Specification of the Model
Theinterrelationships among the six endogenous
and five exogenous variables of our final model can be
summarized by fourstructuralequations and two
identities :6
A A A A
(1)Q*D=Q*D(AP or NP, BEN*, MD*, INC*,
BEDS*).
I' 4
(2)MD*=MD*(AP, Q/MD, MED SCLS,
BEDS*, INC*).
4We are indebted to Christopher Sims of the National Bureau
for bringing this to our attention.
Some of the excluded exogenous variables were significant
in equations in which they appeared, e.g., race as a determinant
of health status, but because the endogenous variable health was
found to be insignificant in the demand equation, both health
and race factored out of the system.
circumflex (A) over a variable indicates that its predicted
value is used in estimating the equation. An asterisk (*) indicates
that the variable is phrased in per capita terms.Expenditures for Physicians' Services Differences Across States, 1966
TABLE 16
A A
(3)Q/MD =Q/MD(AP, MD, BEDS*).
Final
Model
PreliminaryFull Title of Variable (Units)
Model
Endogenous
Quantity per capita (visits)8.
Private physicians per 100,000
population
Quantity per private physician
(vjsjts)a
Average price (dollars)
Insurance benefits per capita
(dollars)
NP NP Net price (dollars)
INF MRT Infant mortality rate per 1,000
live births
DTH RI Crude death rate per 1,000
population
Disposable personal income per
capita (dollars)
Short-term hospital beds per
1,000 population
Number of medical schools
Ratio of health insurance
premiums to benefits
Union members per 100 popula-
tion
EDUC Median years of education,
persons 25 and over
Per cent black
Per cent 65 and over
Per cent urban
Births per 1,000 population
Mean temperature, average of
major cities (degrees F.)
S&L GOV*State and local government
expenditures for health per
capita (dollars)
HOSP MDCHospital staff physicians per
100,000 population
Change in disposable persona.!
income per capita 1960-66
(dollars)
%PART Per cent of private physicians in
partnership practice
%SPEC Per cent of private physicians
who are specialists











These relationships are presented diagrammatically in
Figures 1 and 2.
A
a G.P. outpatient visit equivalents.
blotal of six sample years.




























Figure 1.—Relationships Among Endogenous Variables,
Alternate SpecificationsDifferences Across States, 1966 Expenditures for Physicians' Services
In this equilibrium model of the market for physi-
cians' services, the quantity of service demanded per
capita (Q*D)isidentically equal to the product of the
two supply variables, number of physicians per capita
(MD*) and quantity of service per physician (Q/MD).7
Because it seems unreasonable to suppose that purchases
of medical insurance are unrelated to the price and
quantity of the physicians' services covered, medical
insurance benefits appear endogenously in the model.
Price is represented by two variables: the average price
received by physicians for their services (AP) and the net
pricepaid by consumers (NP), which AP exceeds
according to the degree to which insurance benefits pay
for the cost of the average visit. AP and NP are thus
comparable to the time series variables of the same name
discussed in Part1. The exogenous variables in this
system are per capita income (INC*), number of medical
schools (MED SCLS), hospital beds per capita (BEDS*),
labor union members per capita (UNION*), and the
ratio of health insurance premiums to health insurance
benefits (PRM/BEN).
Both the demand for and the supply of physicians'
services are thought to be subject to special forces.
Whenever possible, we have attempted to incorporate
the unique features often attributed to this market into
our model. The following equation-by-equation discus-
sionof thefourstructural equations listed above
considers these issues and indicates the range of ques-
tionsthatcanbeilluminated by a cross-sectional
analysis.
Demand (Q*D)
Pricesand incomearethe customary economic
determinants of market demand. How important are
these financial considerations to consumers in deter-
mining their demand for physicians' services? Is the
quantity of service demanded at all sensitive to its own
price, and if so, to what extent? Does the quantity
demanded varywith income? What isthe income
elasticity?
What is the role of medical insurance in demand?
Some investigators believe that it is a major influence on
the quantity of care purchased, yet our analysis of the
'It would, of course, be possible to combine the two
dimensions of supply into one overall supply equation, but to do
so would be to discard much valuable information regarding the
behavior of physicians.
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timeseriesdata yields no evidence indicative of a
systematic relationship between changes in benefit levels
and changes in Q*
A related question concerns the mechanism by which
insurance operates on demand (if, indeed, it does). In
one specification of the model, NP replaces AP as the
relevant demand price variable. The argument for so
doing is that the impact of insurance can be entirely
attributed to the reduction it effects in the net price of
care.' The substitution of NP for AP also implies that
patientsareindifferentto variations in the average
amount collected by physicians so long as they are not
personally responsible for financing the differentials. A
less restrictive test of the role of insurance in demand
retains AP as the price variable and adds to the equation
the benefits variable, BEN*. This specification leaves
open the manner in which insurance affects demand. It
alsoallowsforthepossibilitythat consumers are
influenced even by those variations in AP which do not
translate into variations in NP. If price-consciousness is a
firmly ingrained consumer trait, changes in the institu-
tional arrangements governing a particular market may
not be strong enough to suppress altogether the usual
behavior mechanism whereby low cost goods and serv-
ices are sought out, regardless of who gets the bill.
Certain services provided by private practice physi-
cians can only be consumed in hospitals: intensive
diagnostic work-ups and most surgical procedures are
common examples. To a limited extent,then, the
services offered by hospitals and by private practice
physiciansconstitutea joint consumption product,
hospitalized medical care. If for any reason the supply of
hospital beds influences the quantity of hospital care
people purchase, an increase in BEDS* may affect the
demand for physicians' services as well.
The market for physicians' services is characterized
by a high degree of consumer ignorance concerning the
need for services and the central role of the physician as
an authoritative advisor regarding their use. Given these
circumstances, we hypothesize that physicians are able
to generate a demand for their services without lowering
price; we therefore include MD* in the demand equa-
tion. When physicians are abundant in a state, they may
ordercarewhichisnot medically indicated(e.g.,
unnecessary surgery) or of only marginal importance
(e.g.,cosmeticprocedures,numerous postoperative
visits, overzealous well-baby care). Alternatively, when
physicians are very scarce, patients may lower theirExpenditures for Physicians' Services Differences Across States, 1966
expectations and handle minor complaints with a mini-
mum of physician intervention. There is also another
reason why the supply of physicians might exercise a
direct influence on the demand for physicians' services.
A significant part of the cost incurred by the patient is
in the form of time spent in travel and in waiting rooms.
A reduction in the relative scarcity of physicians is
usually associated with both an improvement in their
locational distribution and a decrease in waiting room
time. To the extent that the ease or difficulty of seeing a
physician is a determinant of demand, we have a second
justification for including MD* in the demand equation.
The independent variables in our demand equation
thus fall into two categories: economic variables com-
mon toany demand analysis(price, income) and
institutional factors peculiar to this market (insurance,
hospital bed supply, physician supply). Ten additional
variables—most of whichfallunder the heading of
"taste" factors—were tested in the preliminary version of
the model (see section 2.2). Because none proved to be
statistically significant or measurably improved the fit of
the equations, these were omitted from the final version
of the model presented here, inasmuch as their inclusion
would have injected a bias into the first-stage endoge-
nous variable estimates. The rejected demand variables
are: education (median years of school of persons 25
and over), urbanization, two measures of health status
(the infant mortality rate and the crude death rate), per
cent black, per cent aged, the birth rate, mean annual
temperature, per capitastateand local government
expenditures for physicians' services, and number of
hospitalstaff physicianspercapita. The last two
variables attempted to measure the availability of alter-
native sources of supply of physicians' services (services
by physicians other than private practitioners, who alone
enter our study).
Supply of Physicians (MD*)
Itishypothesized that one variable influencing
physician location is price. AP is clearly the relevant
supply price variable, since it is of little import to the
physician whether payment originates with his patients
or with insurance companies.8 To what extent is the
8Physician behavior might conceivably be affected if the
source of payment were governmental, because of the conse-
quent red tape and the physician's personal political philosophy.
However, only private insurance is considered in this analysis;
data on governmental expenditures for physicians' services are
unavailable on a state basis.
presentlevelof inequalityinthedistribution of
physicians—the number of privatepractitioners per
100,000 ranges from sixty in Mississippi to 134 in New
York—attributable to differences in price?
With price held constant, per capita income serves as
a taste factor in this equation. Specifically, INC* is here
a proxy for the level of cultural, educational, social, and
recreational opportunities which a state has to offer.
Because physicians as a group are very high earners,
nonpecuniary factors of thissort may be a major
consideration in their location decision.
Another possible influence on physician distribution
is the quality and availability of complementary medical
facilities. As a test of this hypothesis we include MED
SCLS and BEDS* in the MD* supply equation.
Finally, we investigate the possibility that physicians
are disinclined to open a practice in states where the
average workload of their would-be colleagues is high.
We should observe a negative sign on the endogenous
variable Q/MD if it is true that physicians shun areas
where they might feel under pressure to work long hours
and/or spend less time per patient than they deem
optimal.
Originally, we hypothesized that physicians would
show some partiality toward their state of origin prior to
entry into medical school, but tests with this variable in
the preliminary model led to its rejection. Also, no
support was found for the view that physicians are
drawn to practice in the medically neediest states, with
medical need being measured by infant mortality (an
endogenous variable), and therefore health, too, was
excluded from this equation in the final model.
Quantity of Service per Physician (Q/MD)
The real quantity of services provided by individ-
ual physicians varies considerably acrossstates, the
coefficient of variation being15.4 per cent. These
productivity differences are an important factor in the
interstate variations in physician gross income, which are
quite large in view of the fairly high uniformity of skill
among physicians.
Three factors are considered as possible influences on
physician productivity. As with the supply variable, the
relationship withpriceisan important matter to
investigate. Do physicians respond to higher prices by
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working more hours and by seeing more patients per
hour, or do they display a backward-bending supply
curve, cutting back on their workload and maintaining
their income while gaining the benefits of additional
leisure and a less hectic pace of activity?
An increase in the supply of hospital beds should
raise Q/MD if physicians have a tendency to hospitalize
more readily whenever the necessary facilities are avail-
able.9 This behavior might arise if there is a technologi-
cal imperative on the part of physicians to practice the
most up-to-date medicine within their grasp.
One of the most critical matters to be investigated is
whether areas with a relative scarcity of physicians are
partly relieved by enjoying higher physician produc-
tivity. It is our hypothesis that the average physician,
because of the nature of his professional training, feels
under some ethical and social compulsion to supply
additional services, even at the same rate of remunera-
tion, when heisinan area poorly endowed with
physicians. Thus, we anticipate a negative sign on the
MD* variable in the Q/MD equation.
Two other variables were initiallytested in this
regression: the degree of physician specialization and the
extent of partnership (as opposed to solo proprietorship)
practice. As neither proved to be significant, the two
were omitted from the final model now under considera-
tion.
Insurance (BEN*)
The argument for treating insurance as an endoge-
nous phenomenon can be made on two grounds. The
first is that the amount of insurance purchased depends
upon the expected level of outlays people are insuring
against. Assuming a generally risk-averse population, an
increaseinexpected outlays shouldcallforth the
purchase of additional insurance protection. Expected
outlays will be highly dependent upon expenditures in
the recent past, and the best proxy for this in our model
is expenditures in the present. The predicted values of
both expenditure components, price and quantity, ap-
pear as explanatory variables in the insurance equation
as a test of this hypothesis. If it is correct, the estimated
coefficients of both variables should be (approximately)
9Ourmeasureof physician output weights hospital inpatient
visits higher than outpatient visits because of differences in their
relative prices.
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equal when the regressions are estimated in double-
logarithmic form. If risk aversion itself rises (is constant,
or falls) with the level of expected loss, the coefficients
will exceed (equal, or fall short of) 1 .0.
The other rationale for regarding insurance as endoge-
nous lays stress on the cost of insurance itself rather
than on the perceived need for the financial protection it
offers. The cost of insurance is defined by the relation
P1V =(PRM/BEN)(AP) —AP.PRM/BEN is the ratio of
health insurance premiums to benefits, i.e., the average
priceof purchasing one dollar of health insurance
benefits (a figure greater than one). PlY thus represents
the average price of insuring one G.P. visit equivalent
over and above the price of purchasing it directly. The
reason for carrying insurance is that, in the event of
extraordinary medical expenses, the return to an individ-
ual who expends PRM/BEN will be many times greater
than one. Of course, there is also the inherent chance
that the return will be as low as zero, but that is the
gamble an insured person takes. On the average, an
insurance payment of PW is the nonrecoverable price
one pays to be reimbursed for one G.P. visit equivalent.
The cost of insuring a given number of visits is thus seen
to depend on two factors, the "fairness" of insurance
policies and the price of physicians' services.
PRM/BEN is exogenous in our model, being depen-
dent upon such factors as the extent of group coverage
compared with individual coverage, and the relative
importance of policies issued by nonprofit insuring
organizations such as Blue Shield. AP, by contrast, is
endogenous. If Ply is found to influence the consumer's
willingness to insure, insurance itself is endogenous as a
result of this dependence. Because PIV is the price of
insuring one visit equivalent and not the price of a
dollar's worth of insurance benefits, the dependent
variable in this specification should really be the number
of insured visit equivalents, or BEN*/AP. For consist-
ency with the financial protection theory of insurance,
which demands a dollar measure of benefits, we main-
tain the BEN* form throughout. When we wish to
interpret the price coefficient as the price elasticity of
demand forinsuredvisits, however, we must first
subtract 1.0 from its estimated value.
Inaddition to PRM/BEN, two other exogenous
variables enter the insurance function: per capita income
and the degree of unionization. The potential effective-
ness of unions derives from their role in winning fringe
benefits in the form of health insurance policies (particu-Expenditures for Physicians' Services Differences Across States, 1966
larly desirable because of their untaxed status). Union-
ization should raise the percentage of the population
covered by insurance, since the decision to insure is no
longer left to the discretion of the individual, and may
also increase the mean level of benefits per insured.
In the preliminary version of our model we tested the
hypothesis that people are differentially inclined to
insure a newly acquired.standard of living as compared
to one which has been long held. The change in per
capitaincome overtheprevioussixyears proved
insignificant in the benefits equation, however, and so
was dropped from the final list of exogenous variables.
Also rejected on the basis of these early tests was the
level of education as a determinant of BEN*.
2.4The Data
Thedata used in this analysis come from a variety
of sources and are of varying reliability. The critical
expenditures and visit series regrettably are not of a kind
in which we can place a high degree of confidence.
Because interstatevariations inthesequantities are
substantial and move in directions that remain fairly
consistent from one year to the next, empirical analysis
of the available data does seem justifiable. Nonetheless,
until such time as a better data base has been estab-
lished, conclusions derived from this study can only be
suggestive of the true underlying relationships.
Expenditures
Our study population consists of the thirty-three
statesfor which expenditures data are available for
1966.' °Mostof the omitted states have small popula-
tions; their absence does not have much effect on the
resultsbecauseeachobservationinour modelis
weighted by the square root of the state population. The
thirty-three states accounted for 90 per cent of the total
U.S. population. The expenditures data come from the
Internal Revenue Service and represent the reported
gross receipts from medical practice of all self-employed
physicians.Thus,thisseriesiscomparable tothe
expenditures data examined in the section on time
trends (Part I).
Availability of expenditures data was one of the key
factors in our selection of a year for the cross-sectional
'°All series refer to 1966 unless otherwise indicated.
analysis. As of this writing, state data on the gross
business receipts of "offices of physicians and surgeons"
have been published for only five other postwar years.
With the exception of 1949 (for which these figures are
obtainable for forty-eight states), the size of the sample
has been limited (twenty-seven states for fiscal 1960-61,
twenty-twofor1963, twenty-eightfor1965, and
twenty-six for 1967). The other controlling factor in our
decision was the availability of data on physician visits
from the National Health Survey. The choice here was
between 1957-59, 1963-64, and 1966-67. 1966 was
chosen because the requisite expenditures data were
available for a relatively large number of states and visit
data were also specific to that year.
The accuracy of the expenditures series is not easy to
check. The possibility of some underreporting of income
is suggested by the fact that the IRS data imply average
gross receipts per physician of $46,600, compared with a
median of $49,000 reported in Medical Economics for
the same year. On the other hand, at least some of this
disparity is explainable by the fact that Medical Eco-
nomics only surveys full-time, self-employed physicians
under the age of sixty-five, while the IRS total includes
the smaller average receipts of older physicians and of
hospital staff and faculty physicians who devote just a
fraction of their working time toprivatepractice.
Furthermore, only if the degree of underreporting varied
significantly across states would this factor impair the
validity of an analysis of variations in expenditures.
Far more serious is the distinct possibility that errors
in this señes are not uniform across states but have a
sizable random component. Our suspicions on this count
are based upon intertemporal correlations of expendi-
tures per capita across the twenty-six states for which
these data are available for 1965, 1966, and 1967. The
correlation coefficient for the 1965-66 comparison is
0.863, and for 1966-67, 0.9 12.1 1Whilethese figures are
high enough to show that there is something systematic
worth investigating in the pattern of variation in 1966
expenditures,theycompareunfavorablywiththe
(weighted) correlation coefficients for per capita dis-
posable income in these states from one year to the
next: 0.998 for 1965-66 and 0.997 for 1966-67. Closer
examination of the official expenditures data reveals
that states with the most extreme jumps in expenditures
had parallel shifts in the number of physicians said to be
''These correlations are weighted by 1966 state population.
The unweighted correlations are 0.760 and 0.824, respectively.
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tiling business income tax returns. These reported shifts
in the number of physicians filing returns show virtually
no correspondence to changes in the number of physi-
cians practicing in each state, a statistical series kept by
the American Medical Association.'2 To cite two of the
most extreme examples, the IRS figures show a gain of
45.1 per cent from 1966 to 1967 in the number of
physicians filing returns in Wisconsin, and a fall of 25.8
per cent in the number filing in Louisiana. According to
the AMA, however, the number of practicing physicians
in these two states rose by 1.2 per cent and 2.0 per cent,
respectively,overthis period.13Itis apparent that
official statistics on health care expenditures are in much
need of improvement. Changes in nationwide expendi-
tures totals over long periods no doubt provide a fairly
accurate indication of changes actually taking place. For
specific years or specific states, however, deficiencies in
the statistical data now constitute a major impediment
to serious research.
Physicians
The scope of the market for physicians' services
relevanttoour study does not extend beyond the
I2 Simpleregressions across states of the annual change in
EXPt+i
total expenditures on the annual change in physi-
EXPt
be highly significant and the explanatory power of the equation
IRShowever, bears almost no relation to the
MDt+, percentage change in private practitioners as recorded
MDt'
by the AMA, even though the correlation between IRS and
bounds of private practice. As the official expenditures
seriesislimited to physicians' gross receipts from
self-employment practice, so the MD series we have
chosen (our source is the American Medical Association)
is restricted to private practitioners.
Unlike the IRS count of physicians filing business
income tax returns, the AMA data have the conceptual;
advantage of including salaried physicians in private
practice, whose services go to meet the same demand as
those of the self-employed and whose contribution to
gross receipts may be considerable. The fact that the
AMA bases its count on the results of routine question.
naires sent annually toallphysicians while the IRS
estimate derives from a sample of physicians filing a
rather unpopular taxreport makes the AMA series
superior from a statistical viewpoint. Also, as noted
above, the extreme instability of the IRS figures calls
into question that data-gathering process itself. Unfortu-
nately, neither the AMA nor the IRS series permits us to
calculate precisely the number of full-time equivalent
physicians in private practice; the former covers physi-
cians whose principal mode of employment is private
practice, while the latter covers all physicians with some
self-employment income, no matter how small a fraction
of theirprofessional timeisinvolved. On balance,
however, the AMA series probably more closely approx-
imates the desired figure of full-time equivalent physi-
cians, since it includes some but not all part-timers and
since it is not restricted to the self-employed.
Quantity and Average Price
Two of the most important series, quantity of
service and average price, are not directly available and
must be estimated. The quantity series we estimate is a
measure of "general practitioner (G. P.) outpatient visit
R2 equivalents," a fairly homogeneous unit across states.
.40 'Dividing expenditures by quantity then gives us an
implicit price series, which represents the average price
of a G. P. outpatient visit equivalent.
The quantity series is derived in the following way.
The National Center for Health Statistics has published
.03 data on home and office visits per capita for the four
census regions in1966-67 and for the nine census
divisions in1957-59. We assume an intraregion per
.01 capita visit distribution of the 1966-67 data based on the
distribution that prevailed in the earlier period. The
resulting home and office visit figure for each division is
then attributed to each state within that division.
cians filing returns show the independent variable to
IRSt





























'3The AMA figures refer to private practice physicians only.
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Next, the number of hospital visits is estimated for
each state from the number of patient days spent in
nonfederal short-term hospitals. Our assumption of one
visitfor each day of stayis supported by Medical
Economics, which reports that the median number of
hospital visits made by private practitioners in 1966 was
twenty-two per week and that the median number of
weeks worked per year was forty-eight.If private
practitionersinthe thirty-three states of our study
conformed to the Medical Economics medians, they
would have made 177 million hospital visits. In fact, the
total number of patient days in these states was very
close to this, 185 million. Combining these disparate
visit series, hospital inpatient visits are given a weight of
1.71 relative to home and office visits, this being the
national ratio of average charges for the two categories
of visits, according to Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare statistics.14
A final adjustment takes account of the fact that the
distribution of total visits between G. P.'s and specialists
varies across states. A visit to a specialist is accorded a
weight of 1 .93 relative to a G. P. visit, based on the ratio
of average gross receipts per visit. In estimating the
percentage of total visits made by specialists in each
state, we, of course, make an allowance for the smaller
visit load of specialists (.63 as many visits as G. P.'s).'
There undoubtedly are some errors in the resulting
quantity series and the price series derived from it, but
we are not aware of any systematic biases. Some
confirmation of the validity of the overall approach may
be found in the fact that the resulting average price for a
G. P. visit in our series is $5.75, which is very close to
the $5.48 implicit in Medical Economics data for the
same year.
Other Variables
All series pertaining to insurance are based upon
data in the Source Book of Health Insurance, an annual
publication of the Health Insurance Institute. The two
endogenous insurance variables, BEN* and NP, refer
only to insurance coverage for physicians' services, i.e.,
surgical, regular medical, and a share of major medical.
of Research and Statistics, Social Security Adminis-
tration, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Medicare Survey Report," Health Insurance Statistics,
CMS-12, January 27, 1970.
figures are derived from survey data published in
Medical Economics (see Appendix C).
The exogenous PRM/BEN variable pertains to all forms
of health insurance (physician, hospital, and disability).
Information regarding the number of medical schools
in each state (MED SCLS) is taken from the annual
education issue of the Journal of the American Medical
Association. BEDS* represents the bed capacity of
short-term, general, and other special hospitals, a series
made available by the American Hospital Association.
Figures on per capita disposable personal income in each
state (INC*) are published in the Sur&'ey of Current
Business. The Statistical Abstract of the United States
provides data on labor union membership (UNION*).
Summary statistics for all variables are presented in
Table17. A completedescriptionof the method
developed to estimate Q*andthe details of all other
calculations may be found in Appendix C, which also
includes specific source references, data tables listing the
most important series, and a correlation matrix.
2.5RegressionResults
Table 18 presents the results of the second-stage
regressions.Allof theequationsare estimated in
double-logarithmic form, the estimated coefficients thus
representing elasticities.' 6 To avoid problems of hetero-
scedasticity, each observation is weighted by the square
root of the state's population.'Incomputing the t
statistics for each variable, we have made those adjust-
ments appropriate for two-stage eStimatiOfl.'
8
'6The one exception applies to MED SCLS, which is phrased
as a linear variable because it sometimes takes on the value zero.
''Plots of the residuals from unweighted regressions demon-
strate an inverse relationship between population and the size of
the unexplained residual.
'8tstatisticsareordinarilyobtained by dividing each
coefficient by its standard error, but this procedure is not valid
when the predicted values of endogenous variables appear on the
right-hand side of an equation. In such cases the following
adjustment is necessary: (1) Recompute the residuals for each
observation by applying the estimated second-stage regression
coefficients to the actual values of the included endogenous
variables. (2) Obtain the ratio of the sum of squared residuals
from the recomputed equation to the sum of squared residuals
from the estimated regression. (3) Multiply each of the original t
statistics for a particular regression equation by this factor
(which may be equal to, greater than, or less than, 1.0) in order
to arrive at a set of adjustedtstatistics applicable to the
second-stage regression. We are most grateful to Christopher





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Expenditures forPhysicians' Services Differences Across States, 1966
TABLE 18
Results of Weighted, Logarithmic Regressions, Second Stage, Interstate Model, 1966 (N33)
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TABLE 18—Concluded






Part B: MD (Physicians per 100,000 Population)—Continued
.791 0037b 1144b 0550b
(10.34) (14.64) (7.04)
.755 0039b 0759b -0.161
(4.47) (5.57) (-1.02)
.783 0.032 0.994 -0.199
(0.69) (0.71) (2.35) (-0.11)
.776 0.027 0.080 0.752 0.443 -0.382
(0.36) (0.27) (0.31) (0.92) (-0.13)
Equation BEDS*





























.819 1•465b 1576b 0739b
(10.89) (-5.04) (-4.26)
.754 1270b -0.259 0.761
(3.62) (-0.93) (1.43)
.814 1•605b 1691b -0.277
(6.66) (-5.04) (-3.87) (-0.68)
.823 0.130 1116a -0.430
(3.28) (1.48) (-2.22) (-1.42)
.820 0.513 0.201 -0.596 -0.030 0.634
(0.77) (1.82) (-0.82) (-0.06) (0.91)
Note: Adjusted titatisticsappear in parentheses.
a Significant at .05 level. at .01 level. CLinearvariable.
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Part A: Demand (Q*)
Income.Estimates of the income elasticity of de-
mand vary over a wide range (0.04 to 0.57), but,
taken together, the equations support the findings of
previous investigators that physicians' services are con-
sidered to be very much of a necessity, with an income
elasticity substantially below 1 .0. Our results correspond
particularly closely with those of Andersen and Benham
[4], even though the units of observation are quite
different (1966 state averages in one instance, 1964
family units in the other).'9 Simple regressions with
income as the sole independent variable produce elastici-
ties of 0.41 and 0.31, respectively, both coefficients
significant at the 0.01 level. The results for multiple
regressionsarealsosimilar.In our more successful
demand equations (A.6-A.1 1) we observe considerably
lower and much less significant income coefficients
(0.20 in A.6, 0.04 in A.7), when indeed income appears
atall.Andersen and Benham reporta statistically
insignificant income elasticity of 0.01 in multiple regres-
sion.20
It should, of course, be stressed that all of these
values refer to the responsiveness of quantity—not of
expenditures—to changes in income. The difference
between the two is not trivial, given the tendency of AP
to rise with income. A simple regression with per capita
expenditures as the dependent variable yields an income
coefficient of 0.96.
One factor that might possibly contribute to the very
low income elasticity of demand is the high correlation
of income with earnings, which, in turn,isa good
indication of the price of time. Physicians' services are
usually time-intensive, and this means that they are more
costly to those with high earnings. Had we estimated the
effect of income with earnings held constant, it is likely
'9Andersen and Benham, in their calculations for physician
use, employ anestimateof "permanent income" as the
independent variable rather than measured income, but this does
not imply incomparability with our results since the transitory
component of income is largely eliminated by using grouped
data.
30Other demand elasticities reported in the literature are
0.62 and 0.21, respectively, in Feldstein [17] and Fein (15].
The elasticity implicit in Fein's book was computed by Herbert
Klaxman [271.
that a higher elasticity would result.2Unfortunately,
the requisite state data are not available.
Chart4
Ratio of Number of Physician Visits by Persons with Family
Income Greater than $10,000toVisits by Persons with
Family Income Less than $3,000, by Age and Sex, 1966-67
-
_________________________
Source:U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
"Volume of PhysicianVisits, United States, July 1966-June
1967," Vital and Health Statistics, Series 10, No. 49, November
1968, p. 19.
Theimportance of the earnings factor can be appreci-
ated from Chart 4, which shows, for various age and sex
classes, the 1966 ratio of per capita physician visits made
by persons with family incomes over $10,000 to those
made by persons with family incomes under $3,000.
2MorrisSilver postulates a positive relationship between
earnings and expenditures for physicians' services, and his results
bear this out (40J. But such a finding can be readily explained
by the close association between earnings and price. It does not
necessarily contradict our view that high earnings have a negative
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Both sexes under the age of fourteen display very high
visit-relatives;thesameholdstrue for males aged
sixty-five and over. In essence, earnings are held nearly
constant (at approximately zero) as family income rises
for these groups, allowing us to observe the effect on
demand of income alone. The implicit income elasticities
of demand are still less than 1.0, but hardly negligible.
By contrast, income exerts no systematic influence upon
visits of persons aged fifteen to sixty-four; the positive
effect of income on demand, we believe, is nullified by
the negative effect of earnings (i.e., the price of time).
Also in accord with our expectations is the fact that
among the twenty-five to sixty-four age group, where
male labor-force participation rates are roughly twice as
large as those for females, income exerts somewhat more
of an influence on visits by females than visits by males.
Indeed, only two of the eighteen age-sex categories
behave in a contrary fashion to what we would expect
under our hypothesis if it were the sole means of
explaining age-sex differences in the effect of income on
demand.22
Omission of quality differences from our quantity
measure may also be exerting a downward bias on the
estimated income elasticity, but the nature of medical
education in this country (all recognized schools must
have AMA accreditation, and National Board Examina-
tionsareincreasingly employed as a state licensure
requirement) makes it unlikely that state-to-state quality
differences among physicians are an important factor.
On balance, we believe that variations in earnings, on the
one hand, and patients' belief in the essential nature of
physicians' services, on the other, are responsible for the
low income elasticity of demand.23
We should emphasize that problems of multicollin-
earity prevent any firm conclusions regarding the exact
magnitude of the income coefficient. Thus, our income
elasticities are consistently larger and generally more
significant in the equations that do not consider MD*
a variable than in those that do. The great improvement
in explanatory power which results with the introduc-
tion of MD* (A.6 versus A.2, A.7 versus A.5) and the
•22Visit-relatives for women sixty-five to seventy-five and
seventy-five and over rise rapidly, as predicted, over low income
classes, but then fall even more steeply, for some unknown
reason, over high income classes.
23This is not to say thatall, or even most, physicians'
services are technically essential for health. To believe in their
efficacy is.sufficient to make the average individual treat them as
a necessity in his budget.
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consistently high t statistic attaching to the physician
variable lend credence to the latter specification. It is
clear that, of the two variables, MD* is dominant, with
income playingacomparatively minor role. These
qualifications notwithstanding, there is nothing in these
equations—regardless of what combination of variables
we consider—to suggest an income elasticity even ap-
proaching 1.0. All of the evidence indicates that the
demand for physicians' services is quite income-inelastic,
though precisely to what degree we cannot accurately
say.
Price andInsurance.The priceelasticity of de-
mand for physicians' services appears to be unusually
low. None of the equations reported in Table 18.A
show AP or NP coefficients exceeding (in absolute value)
—0.36. The t statistics on the price variables indicate that
a high degree of confidence can be placed in this finding.
Our result parallels Paul Feldstein's finding [17] of a
low demand price elasticity of —0.19, also significantly
different from zero.24
There are three principal explanations for the relative
insensitivity of demand to changes in price. First, it
should be remembered that the demand for physicians'
services isderived from the consumer's demand for
health. Michael Grossman has estimated the price elastic-
ity of demand for health at —0.5[22],which seems
reasonable, given the absence of any close substitutes for
health. The price elasticity of demand for a derived
input must be lower than for the final commodity unless
there are important possibilities of substitution with
other inputs.This leads to the second explanation,
namely, that there are many legal and psychological
barriers against the substitution of persons without the
M.D. degree in the physicians's role, even though such
persons might be good substitutes in a technical sense.
Similarly, there are many factors other than medical
manpower that contribute to the individual's production
of health, inciuding diet, housing, recreation, and educa-
tion. These may, in fact, be excellent alternatives to
physicians' services in the long run, but may not be so
regarded by the patient.25
Finally, it should be noted that the price paid is only
part of the total cost of physicians' services to the
24Feldstein's study pertained to physician visits by families
in 1953.
25The same argument can be made with regard to "negative
inputs" in the production of health, including such consumption
items as tobacco, alcohol, narcotics, and (occasionally) motor
vehicles.Expenditures for Physicians' Services Differences Across States, 1966
patient.Inadditiontopossible inconvenience, the
patient must reckon with costs of transportation and,
more important, time spent in travel, waiting, and during
the visit itself. These indirect costs (IC) vary greatly
from individual to individual, though in general we
would expect a positive association between them and
the direct cost of a visit (AP) because IC is closely
dependent upon the priceof time, AP varies with
income, and both income and the price of time are
highly correlated with earnings. In the event that IC and
AP are perfectly correlated, variations in AP are exactly
proportional to variations in the total price of a visit and
the AP coefficients we estimate are not biased, despite
the omission of an IC variable. If, however, IC tends to
risefaster than AP, we are underestimating the true
interstate variation in price and thereby overestimating
theprice elasticity of demand, and vice versa. The
directionof possiblebias from thissourceisnot
ascertainable.
The relevance of insurance to demand is tested in two
ways. We first investigate the role of insurance using the
BEN* variable. Unfortunately, strong multicollinearity
between income and benefits prevents any conclusions
on this score. Theis essentially unchanged, whether
we employ income, benefits, or both in the demand
regression (A.2-A.4); while either variable alone is highly
significant, both show much lower t values when they
appear jointly. It is impossible to infer how much of the
observed variation in Q*isattributable to each of these
variables, or what the true coefficients of each are.
NP is superior to BEN* as a measure of insurance
because of its much smaller correlation with INC* (0.14
versus 0.86). Using NP we may consider all economic
influences on demand simultaneously (he., income,
average price, and insurance, the latter two embodied in
the NP variable). With insurance thus accounted for, we
observe a somewhat smaller but still very significant
income elasticity as compared to the case of income and
average price considered alone (A.5 versus A.2). The
high correlation between AP and NP nonetheless compli-
cates the critical judgment as to whether insurance per se
is important to demand. In some instances AP is the
stronger variable (A.6 versus A.5), while in others the
situation is reversed and NP is stronger (A.8 versus A.9).
But in any case, the price elasticity of demand is not
much affected by the choice between these two price
variables.
What we can say with assurance concerning the role
of insurance in demand is that the elasticity of Q*with
respect to BEN* is, at most, fairly low. That is, even
under the extreme assumption that INC* is of no real
importance in this relation, the elasticity with respect to
BEN* is only 0.31. The very large t statistic on BEN* in
A.4 indicates not only that this coefficient is signifi-
cantly greater than 0, but also that it is significantly less
than 0.4. Such a finding is not in line with our prior
notions concerning the effect of insurance, despite the
fact that in at least one instance comparable findings
have been reported in the literature.26 Some discussion
of possible explanations is, therefore, in order.
First, the prevailing impression about insurance is
that it induces higher utilization by lowering the price
faced by the consumer. Yet if this is the mechanism
through which insurance operates on demand, and if
demand isprice-inelastic, as we have found the case
to be, itis to be expected that demand will also be
insurance-inelastic. For example, if benefits initially
reimburse 40 per cent of average price, a 1 per cent rise
in BEN* will produce a 0.67 per cent fall in NP (from
0.60 AP to 0.596 AP). With a (net) price elasticity of
—0.20, this will result in only a 0.13 per cent rise in Q*
(closeto the 0.18 rise shown by A.3). On the other
hand, if demand were highly responsive to price changes,
say with an elasticity of—i .5, the same 1 per cent rise in
BEN* would call forth a 1.00 per cent rise in Q*.It
should be noted that we would expect the effect of
insurance on demand to be greater among persons with a
very low or negligible price of time (the young, the
elderly, the unemployed), because incremental insurance
benefits for them result in a much larger percentage
change in the full price of a visit.
A second factor is that private insurance for physi-
cians' services is usually heavily biased toward coverage
of relatively nondiscretionary care. Surgical procedures
and in-hospital care are far more likely to be reimbursed
than routine office visits or preventive services [34] ; This
restriction in coverage may greatly reduce the impact of
insurance relative to what it might have been.
Physicians. The highly significant role of MD* in
the demand equationrequires somediscussion.It
cannot be attributed to a supply-induced fall in the
26Paul Feldstein [17J uses an insurance variable (the ratio of
benefits to expenditures) in his demand analysis. Contrary to his
expectations,theelasticityisnegative, though insignificant.
Regrettably, no discussion of this finding appears in the text.
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physician's fee because price (AP or NP) is already held
constant. Rather,itseems to be the result of the
following forces.
First, an increase in MD* is likely to reduce the
average distance separating patient and physician, as well
as the average waiting time. The consequent saving in
time and transportation expense lowers the total cost of
a visit to the patient even if fees are held constant. Given
a low price elasticity of demand, however, this factor
alone is insufficient to account for the magnitude of the
MD* coefficient.
A second possibilityis that physicians themselves
inflate demand whenever the supply of medical man-
powerisrelativelyslack.Thisthesisisput forth
persuasively by Eli Ginzberg: "...thesupply of medical
resources has thus far effectively generated its own
demand.... Much unnécessary surgery continues to be
performed.... There is substantial overdoctoring for a
host of diseases, including, in particular, infections of
the upper respiratorytract.. ..[physicians]usually
have wide margins of discretion about whether to
recommend that a patient return to the office for one or
more follow-up visits [21] ."
Asupply-induced demand change is fully sufficient as
an explanation for the role of MD* in the Q*equations
of Table 1 8.A; if verified, its implications for policy are
profound. Evidence that the additional physicians' serv-
ices provided under loose supply conditions are, in fact,
of a marginal nature is presented in the discussion of the
effect of physicians' services on health in section 2.6.
This much is to be expected if, as Ginzberg also suggests,
physicians gravitate towards the more serious cases as
their supply becomes taut.
A third possible explanation for the importance of
is the existence of permanent excess demand for
physicians' services. Thisisthethesis advanced by
Martin Feldstein [16], whose time series analysis of this
market yielded positive demand price elasticities (as high
as 1.67), inconsistent with an equilibrium hypothesis.
Feldstein's negative and significant insurance elasticities
and hisoccasionally negative income elasticities are
likewise inexplicable under normal market conditions. In
our view, a much simpler interpretation of Feldstein's
results is the failure to take account of technological
change, which shifted the demand curve to the right over
time, and not at a constant rate. Since the cross-section
regressions, which essentially hold technology constant,
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are readily interpretable under the assumption of market
equilibrium, we see no reason to substitute either here or
in the time series the less defensible explanation of
permanent excess demand.
Hospital Bed Supply. Introducing BEDS* into any
of the demand equations discussed above seriously
affectsthe conclusions to be drawn regarding price
(either AP or NP). A.1Oisillustrative: The price
coefficient approaches zero (in some equations it actu-
ally becomes positive) and the variable loses all statistical
significance. Indeed, the "best" demand equations, in
terms of sheer explanatory power isone in which
price, income, and insurance have all been dropped and
only MD* and BEDS* appear (A.l 1).
Accepting the results of A.l 1 on face value may
nonetheless be seriouslymisleading. To be sure,a
rationaleisadvanced hereinsupport of a causal
relationship running from bed supply to demand for•
physicians' services. That is, the services of hospitals and
of physicians are in many ways a joint consumption
item, and thus an increase in the former serving to meet
a backlog inits demand willpermit an expanded
consumption of physicians' services, desired but tech-
nically unfeasible previously due to the unavailability of
therequisitehospitalfacilities. Beyond this, if the
frequent allegation is true that the supply of hospital
beds tends to create its own demand, it follows that any
increase in BEDS*, even if wholly unrelated to the
prevailing demand for hospitalization, will (indirectly)
raise Q*aswell.
The trouble with this explanation for the role of
BEDS* in the Q*equationis that it takes no account of
the fact that the relationship between these two vari-
ables is inherently biased by the very method used to
construct Q*•Hospitaldays per capita comprise one of
the three components of the quantity series, and because
there is so little interstate variation in occupancy rates,
days are almost entirely proportional to bed capacity. In
our judgment, BEDS* is probably significant in theQ*
equationnot so much because it bears a causal relation-
ship to the dependent variable but rather because of the
statistical dependence of Q*uponBEDS*. Equations in
section A that do not include BEDS* are probably more
accurate indications of the true determinants of demand
for this reason.Expenditures for Physicians' Services Differences Across States, 1966
Part B: Supply of Physicians (MD*)
Medicalschools, price, hospital bed supply, and
per capita income are the principal factors influencing
physicians' locational decisions (Table18.B). Collin-
earity among the last three of these variables makes it
difficult to determine precisely the specific effect of
each, but the four together account for about 78 per
cent of the variation in MD*.
The role of the medical school in physician location is
twofold. As a center of education it draws doctors-to-be
to the state, and its affiliated hospitals attract interns
and residents. Professional contacts are established, and
young families take root. As a major medical center, it
generally promises superior staff and facilities in its
teaching hospitals. Regardless of where they trained,
physicians may find it advantageous to have such a
complex within close proximity of their practice, for it
allows them to arrange referrals and consultations while
maintaining contact with the patient. Our estimated
coefficient, highly significantinallbut two cases,
indicates that on the average one additional medical
schoolina stateraisesthe number of physicians
practicing there by about 4 per cent.
A glance at equations B.2-B.8 makes apparent the
presence of collinearity among the three other important
location variables. Price is highly significant, with coef-
ficients ranging from 0.83 to 1 .14, in those equations
where it appears alone with MED SCLS or where BEDS*
is also present (B.3, B.6, B.7), but with BEDS* dropped
and INC* retained, the price coefficient falls consider-
ably and loses its significance (B.S). In like fashion,
INC* is a significant variable, with an elasticity of 0.49
to 0.76, when it appears alone with MED SCLS or in
conjunction with either AP or BEDS* (B.2, B.S, B.8),
but both itscoefficient and its adjusted tstatistic
plummet when all four variables enter the equation
(B.6). Similarly, BEDS* is significant if, and only if, AP
also appears in the equation (B.6 and B.7, but not B.4or
B.8). It is with caution, therefore, that we proceed toa
discussion of these results.
Our average price measure is clearly superior as a
supplyvariableinthiscontext to physician gross
income, the monetary incentive variable employed by
Benham, Maurizi, and Reder [7]. In their analysis the
two-stage least squares method was utilized to estimate
demand and supplyequationsforthe number of
physicians in each state in 1950, but, while physician
income had a positive sign in the supply equation, it was
not statistically significant. This is as expected: business
receipts are positively related to workload as well as to
price, and it is surely unreasonable to expect doctors to
be attracted to states where they can anticipate little
leisure time. If anything, the opposite hypothesis merits
consideration, and we investigate this possibility. Unlike
the demand equations, where there was some question
regarding the specification of the relevent price variable
itself (AP or NP), AP is obviously the correct choice in
this case, since it matters little, if at all, to the supplier
of services who is paying the bills he sends out.
INC* serves in the physician supply equation as a
general taste variable rather than as an indication of
financial inducements to settlement, since price is also
held constant. As predicted, the life style available in
high-income states does appear to exercise some influ-
ence over the location of physicians.27 Hospital bed
supply—which is probably a proxy in a more general
sense for the whole range of medical facilities and
auxiliary personnel—also appears to be an important
nonpecuniary consideration in physicians' location deci-
sions.
No support is found for the view that physicians
actually shun states where the physician work-
load is high. The endogenous Q/MD variable bears the
anticipated negative sign but never approaches signifi-
cance, and its inclusion, in fact, only serves to reduce the
adjusted R2 of the regression (B.9 versus B.7, B.10
versus B.6). That certain areas, both rural and urban
27 thetotal number of practicing physicians in the
country (MDi) is constant in cross-section, an analysis such as
this can only throw light on the reasons for geographic variation
in this total. Given the presence of substantial barriers to entry
into medicine, itis wholly unwarranted to conclude that the
same behavioral patterns observed for physicians in cross-section
will also apply over time in the determination of MDI. In all
probability, a proportional change in INC* across all states
would have no effect on or on the partIcular state levels of
MD*,t. It follows that only variations in relativeincomeare
potentially influential in determining the geographic distribution
of a given number of physicians. The relative attractiveness of a
stateis best represented by ,wherethe denominator
represents mean per capita income for the sample. Replacing our
INC* variables with this relative income measure would have no
effect on the estimated elasticities because the corresponding
values of both variables are proportional in any one year. But it
is best kept in mind that the INC* variable of Table 18.B should
only be interpreted in a reLative sense.
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ghetto, are unpopular with physicians is indisputable,
but fear of overwork does not appear to be a factor in
their judgment.
Part C: Quantityper Physician (0/MD)
Thenumber of physicians per capitais the only
variable tested that clearly has a significant impact on
physician productivity. It alone accounts for 60 per cent
of the variation in Q/MD. The coefficient of the
variable indicates that about two-thirds of the incre-
mental supply of physicians' services that might be
expected to ensue with an increase in the number of
physicianspracticinginastatewill beeffectively
nullified by a reductioninoutput of the average
practitioner. These results suggest that increases in the
number of physicians in a state, whether resulting from
shifts in distribution or expansion of the total stock,
may actuallyresultinhigher prices for physicians'
services. According to the regressions, a 10 per cent rise
in MD* will lead to a 4 per cent rise in demand as the
new physicians create a market for their services, but
the supply of services may rise by as little as 3 1/3 per
cent once resident doctors have adjusted to the de-
creased urgency of unattended cases and opted for a
reduction in their activity.
Thepriceelasticityof supplyperphysicianis
probably low. Only a very small degree of confidence
can attach to the initial finding of a negative price
elasticity. Some collinearity between AP and MD* is
present, as demonstrated by the reduced t statistic of
each when they appear jointly (C.! and C.2 versus
although C.3, with price included, is superior to C.2,
C.4 is inferior to C.5. These results are not unlike those
reported by Martin Feldstein [16]: price coefficients in
his supply-per-physician equations range from —0.28 to
—l .91, with only the higher (absolute) values achieving
significance at the 5 per cent level. In any case, we find
no support for the hypothesis that higher prices induce
additional services from physicians already located in a
state.
Adding BEDS* to the productivity equation with
only MD* in it increases the explanatory power by a fair
amount (C.5 versus C.2), but the BEDS* coefficient is
statistically insignificant and of a low magnitude.
Part D: Insurance (BEN*)
The purchase of physician insurance by consumers,
as distinct from physician care itself, appears to be
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verysensitiveto variations in personal income. We
find elasticities ranging from 0.76 to 1.61, and in all
cases but one they are significant at the 1 per cent level
(the exception is D.7, where the simultaneous presence
of so many independent variables cancels the signifi-
cance of each arid also lowers the INC* elasticity).
Three other hypotheses are investigated relating to
the determinants of BEN*. Again, because of high
correlations among the independent variables, we test
these theories one at a time before assessing their effects
in combination.
The degree of unionization has a small but important
effect on BEN*, raising thefrom 0.74 in D.1 to 0.81
in D.2. This conclusion is weakened when PRM/BEN
and AP also appear in the equation, but even then the
2 is improved by inclusion of UNION* (D.6 versus
D.3).
The purchase of insurance seems to be very respon-
sivetoitsprice, PIV. This composite variableis
dependent both upon the average price of physicians'
services and upon the cost of one dollar of insurance
benefits. As predicted by this hypothesis, the coeffi-
dents of AP and PRM/BEN are each negative and highly
significant in D.3. Deducting 1.0 from the estimated AP
coefficient allows us to interpret the equation as a
representation of the demand for insured visit equiva-
lents (i.e., BEN*/AP). We see that the price elasticity of
demand, as indicated by both PlY components, appears
to be quite high, on the order of —1.58 to _1.74.25
Apparently, the decision to purchase medical insurance
is influenced much more by income and price than is the
decision to purchase physicians' services.
We findriosupport for thefinancial-protection
theory of insurance, which holds that the amount of
insurance people wish to carry varies directly with the
levelof anticipatedexpenditures they areinsuring
against. This theory predicts equal, positive coefficients
of approximately 1.0 for both AP and Q*,29yetwe find
of some collinearity between these variables and
UNION*, the significance level of each of the three is diminished
in D.6, and the coefficients somewhat lower as well.
291t may be argued that insurance purchases are sensitive
both to their price and to anticipated expenditures levels, and
that AP thereforeservesina dual capacity in the BEN*
regression.If thisiscorrect, the AP coefficient we observe
should be on the order of -O.6(+1.O for the expenditures theory
and -1.6 for the price theory). This possibility is tested and
rejected in D.5, for the PRM/BEN and AP coefficients are
essentially unchanged from their values in D.3, while Q* is now
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in D.4 that the coefficient of AP is negative, while that
of Q*ispositivebut notstatisticallysignificant.
Dropping Q* from the regression brings about a slight
improvement in the R2 (D.7 versus D.6, D.5 versus D.3)
and permits a much less ambiguous interpretation of the
role of AP in insurance purchases. It is only because of
its dependence upon AP that insurance is endogenous to
this system.
Because of the many ambiguities complicating the
interpretation of most of these regression equations, we
feel it wisest to refrain from presenting a reduced-form
version of the modelWe have seen that two of the
exogenous variables_.BEDS* and INC*_lend themselves
to more than one interpretation, depending upon the
equation in which they appear, but such distinctions
would be lost in a reduced form. More serious is the
problem of multicollinearity. The consequent instability
of coefficient estimates is troublesome enough in the
interpretation of individual regression equations, but
thenatleastitis known which variables must be
approached with caution. In a reduced form, because of
the intricate pattern of substitutions, this instability
may be magnified manyfold and its repercussions felt
throughout theentiresystem. Depending upon the
choice of equations to represent the model, numerous
versions of the reduced form are possible, some with
sharplycontrasting implications. Under the circum-
stances, it seems preferable to state the limitations of
our knowledge rather than compound the possibility of
error.
2.6The Effect on Health
Thedegree to which variations in the quantity of
physiojans' services consumed affect health status, i.e.,
Health =f(Q*,.
..),isa matter of prime concern. A
priori considerations suggest that causality might run in
the reverse direction as well, from health to demand
(Q* =g(Health,...)l.Ifso, two-stage least squares
would be the recommended method for determining the
effect of quantity on health, with the predicted value of
the endogenous Q* variable entering the health regres-
sions and vice versa. In the preliminary large-scale model
described in 2.2, this procedure was adopted. As noted
earlier, however, tests based upon this model lent no
support to the hypothesis that variations in health
°In a reduced form, individual regression equations are
solved so that Q* and AP can be expressed wholly in terms of
the exogenous variables.
contribute to interstate variations in the demand for
physicians' services. Hence, coefficients obtained from
ordinary least squares regressions of health on Q* should
not be biased.3 1
Two dependent variables have been chosen to repre-
sent health status in these regressions: the death
rate (DTH RT) and the infant mortality/ rate (INF
MRT). The independent variables include/factors of a
general nature—income, education, per cent black, and
percentaged(thislastonlyinthe DTH RT
equations)—and factors specifically related to the con-
sumption of physicians' services. In addition to Q*, we
test MD* and per capita expenditures for physicians'
services (EXP*) in this equation. The first of these is,
theoretically, the desired variable, but because of possi-
ble measurement errors we do not rely upon it exclu-
sively. No two of these physician variables rely upon the
same data base.
The most important conclusion we can draw from the
regressions of Table 19 is that, other things being equal,
variation in the consumption of physicians' services does
not seem to have any significant effect on health, as
measured by either the crude death rate or the infant
mortality rate. This finding is consistent with the work
of previous investigators concerning the relative unim-
portance of medical care (not restricted to physicians'
services) as a determinant of interstate variations in
death rates [5].
Higher educational levels are very strongly associated
with lower crude death rates. Education is also nega-
tively related to infant mortality, but not ,statistically
significant.32 Contrary to what many would expect, per
capita income is positively related to the crude death
rate after controlling for the effect of education. It is,
however, negatively related to infant mortality. These
results for education and income confirm the findings of
'Two-stage regressions with health as the dependent vari-
able are not feasible within the context of the present model.
This is because the exogenous determinants of health do not
appearinthe model. Their exclusion was based upon the
insignificanceof healthitselfinthe demand equation. To
reintroduce health would necessitate bringing back into the
model several exogenous variables that bear no demonstrable
relationshiptothe market for physicians' services, and, as
explained in 2.2, this, in turn, would impart a bias to all of the
first-stage predicted endogenous variables.
320ur analysis implicitly assumes causality to run only from
education to health, but this is not necessarily the case. See the
forthcoming paper by Victor Fuchs and Michael Grossman [201.
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TABLE 19
Results of Weighted, Logarithmic Health Regressions, Ordinary Least Squares, Interstate Model, 1966
(t valuesin parentheses)
Equation INC* %BLKa EDUC Q* MD* EXP*
Part A
DTH RTDR. 1 .560 -0.008
(6.41) (-0.12)
DR. 2 .679 0061b 0364b
(8.25) (-3.33)
DR. 3 .814 0333b 0823b
(10.71) (4.79) (-6.49)
DR. 4 .811 0•062b 0354b 0.001 0780b
(9.90) (4.68) (0.73) (-5.54)
DR. 5 .804 0062b 0347b 0.001 0779b 0.016
(9.31) (3.67) (0.71) (-5.42) (0.13)
DR. 6 .811 0062b 0404b 0.001 0739b -0.05 7
(9.93) (4.44) (0.87) (-5.04) (-0.99)
DR. 7 .815 0059b 0391b 0.001 0658b -0.079
(8.95) (4.85) (0.88) (-3.86) (-1.24)
Part B
INF MRT IM. 1 .796 -0.144
(-1.68) (6.47)
IM.2 .787 0011b -0.196
(6.33) (-1.19)
IM.3 .791 -0.122 0010b -0.083
(-1.22) (5.55) (-0.44)
IM. 4 .785 -0.089 -0.090 -0.079
(-0.73) (5.43) (-0.47) (-0.50)
IM. 5 .783 -0.132 -0.090 0.011
(-1.08) (5.38) (-0.46) (0.14)
IM. 6 .787 -0.152 0•010b -0.172 0.056
(-1.38) (5.10) (-0.75) (0.69)
aLinearvariable.
at .01 level.
Fuchs [19], Grossman [22], and Auster,Leveson,and2.7Conclusion
Sarachek[5].Theper cent black is positively associated
with both death variables, but the effect is much greater In Part 2 we have presented a formal econometric
with respect to infant mortality. model of the market for physicians' services in 1966,
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using cross-sectional data for our estimates. The findings,
which must be regarded as tentative because of the
limited quantity and uneven quality of available data,
tend to be consistent with, and give support to, the
inferences drawn from the time series examined in
Part 1.
The demand for physicians' services appears to be
significantly influenced by the number of physicians
available. The effect exerted on demand by supply
appears to be stronger than that of income, price, or
insurance coverage. Physician supply, across states, is
positivelyrelatedtoprice, the presence of medical
schools and hospital beds, and the educational, cultural,
and recreational milieu. The quantity of service pro-
duced physician is negatively related to the number
of physicians in an area. It does not increase in response
to higher fees. The demand for medical insurance, unlike
the demand for physicians' services, does appear to be
quitesensitivetodifferences in income.Itisalso
significantly related to the price of insurance and to
unionization. Finally, interstate differences in infant
mortality and overall death rates are not significantly
related to the number of physicians, to the quantity of
their services, or to expenditures.
If subsequent research should confirm these findings,
the implications for public policy are substantial. Ac-
cording to a widespread view, large increases in the
number of physicians will drive down the price of, and
expenditures for, physicians' services, will diminish the
inequality in their location, provide a proportionate
increaseinthequantityof services,and make a
substantial contribution to improved health levels. The
model and data we have examined do not provide any
support for this view.
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